Abstract. We develop a strategic model of information acquisition in networks where agents pay for all the pieces of information they acquire, including those through indirect links. The cost of information depends on the distance it traverses in the network. We consider two possibilities in this context: (i) increase with distance, and (ii) they decrease with distance. The paper also examines situations where it is more expensive to acquire information of higher value. We show that there is almost no divergence between the efficient and Nash equilibrium information architectures. We then study the effect of decay in networks where information through longer paths is cheaper. Finally, we also examine a model with costly link formation that combines both types of cost related assumptions.
Introduction
Communication is one of the major pillars of all societies and economic systems. It leads to the dissemination of information, helping well informed agents make better decisions. Often such communication takes place through a network of bilateral links between the participants. This paper develops a strategic model of information networks in which agents choose their own link partners, resulting in different network configurations. The network is used to acquire information and agents pay for all the information acquired through the network. Network structure determines the payoffs and hence the set of stable and efficient networks.
Information networks were first analyzed by graph theorists in the context of gossip and broadcast problems. In a gossip network, every individual possesses a unique piece of gossip which needs to be communicated to the others (Baker and Shostak (1972) ). In the broadcast version on the other hand, one person wishes to communicate information to all others in the network. A survey of this literature including the basic problem and its many extensions can be found in Hedetniemi et al. (1988) . The focus of this literature is on the dissemination issue and is captured mainly by some aggregate network criterion such as the minimum number of links needed to ensure that the gossip reaches everyone, or the minimum number of rounds required for everyone to hear the gossip. This literature rarely considers the costs of the links or individual costs and benefits. In other words, strategic interactions are conspicuously absent from this work. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) examined strategic behavior in networks using a stability concept called pairwise stability. 1 Soon after, the notion of Nash networks was introduced in a paper by Bala and Goyal (2000a; henceforth [BG] ). 2 They assume that link formation is unilateral with the initiating player incurring all the costs of establishing the link. A link can only be broken by the initiating player. In their model, when player i has a link with player j, she can access j's information and the information of all the other players j is linked to, without having to pay for these indirect links. The paper analyzes information flow in a directed and undirected network both in the presence and absence of information decay.
Our paper builds on Nash networks of the Bala and Goyal (2000a) type. We assume that every agent has a unique piece of information with some intrinsic value and would like to gather more information by linking to other agents. Unlike much of the earlier work, we incorporate an element of realism by allowing each agent to have a different endowment of information (see also Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2004) ). Secondly, information seekers have to pay for all the information they acquire in the network, i.e., we do not allow for free indirect links. We begin by studying this problem in situations where establishing links is free. Then we examine the implications of having fixed setup costs for each link. Since the free indirect link externality is stronger in the case of two-way information flow, we focus on this model. Third, instead of using an exogenously given link cost, we develop an alternative cost formulation with two components. One component suggests that information of higher value costs more, though we also analyze the problem without this assumption by giving all agents the same value of information. The second component of the cost function allows costs of information to vary with the distance it travels in the network.
We consider two possible cases of relating costs with distance − each providing a different interpretation of network distance. The first interpretation of network distance is a spatial one while in the second instance distance is a proxy for time. The former allows information coming from a greater distance to be more expensive. This is applicable to information networks where physical distance is relevant for exchanging information like international phone calls being more expensive than domestic ones. It is also true when information needs to be transported over geographical distances, i.e. shipping a good farther is usually more expensive.
The second cost formulation allows for the cost of information to vary inversely with distance. This implies longer paths in the network lead to information delays or involve waiting, and hence are cheaper. This cost structure is relevant for some types of electronic networks. Network applications can be characterized by their differing Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, such as real-time video with high bandwidth and low delay requirements, or the opposite where bandwidth requirements are flexible and delay is tolerable. While the technological aspects of this problem have been extensively studied, there is a growing literature on pricing in computer networks (see for instance Sairamesh et al. (1995) ).
With the advent of cost based service provisioning, network users are expected to pay for, or at least share the cost of each network resource they utilize (see for example, Herzog, Shenker and Estrin (1997)). Network users maximize their payoffs in terms of costs and QoS benefits by selecting appropriate sets of users with whom to share network resources. In particular, this can be used to model Available Bit Rate (ABR) traffic whose bandwidth requirements are elastic and is suitable for applications like email, file transfer or web browsing. These applications cannot tolerate any packet (or information) loss but have flexible delay or bandwidth requirements. Therefore, as in the model, users will accept the routing of their data via longer paths in exchange for lower costs.
This cost formulation is also of theoretical interest since the set of incentives that govern behavior in our model can be applied to the Bala and Goyal (2000a) model and its direct extensions. Following the analysis of the two benchmark models we study the effect of decay in networks where information through longer paths is cheaper. An interesting trade-off exists in this model since decay offsets the desire for agents to have longer paths in the network. Finally, we examine a model with costly link formation that combines both types of cost related assumptions. Section 2 describes the basic model. In section 3 we analyze the stability and efficiency properties of networks. Section 4 explores alternative formulations that incorporate both cost assumptions. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Let I = {1, 2, . . . n} be the set of agents with n ≥ 3. For ordered pairs (i, j) ∈ I × I the shorthand notation ij is used. Agents in the model are information seekers who gain utility from having more information. Each individual i ∈ I has an information endowment of value V i ≥ 0. Also V i 6 = V j for i 6 = j defines the heterogeneity of agents' endowments. All agents are aware of the value of the non-rival information possessed by other agents. Access to information possessed by other agents can be gained by forming links with them, and through links established by other connected agents. Link formation occurs simultaneously resulting in an information network.
Strategies. Formally, a strategy of agent i ∈ I is a vector g i = (g i1 , g i2 , . . . , g ii−1 , g ii+1 , . . . , g in ) where g ij ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ I\{i}. If i forms a link with j, then g ij = 1 allowing information to flow from i to j and from j to i, i.e, information flow in the network is two-way. If no link exists between i and j, then g ij = 0, permitting no information flow. We follow the noncooperative strand of the literature allowing only the initiating agent to break a link. We restrict attention to fully reliable links and pure strategies. The set of all strategies of individual i is denoted by G i and the set of strategy profiles by G = × n i=1 G i . A strategy profile g = (g 1 , g 2 , . . . ., g n ) ∈ G is equivalent to a (directed) network, where each vertex depicts an agent and each link forms an edge with the arrow pointing to the person with whom the link is established. 3 We now introduce some graph-theoretic definitions for undirected graphs based on West (1996) . A walk is a sequences of vertices and edges in a graph such that each vertex belongs only to the preceding and succeeding edge. In a directed graph this must follow the direction of the arrows. A (open) walk with no repeated vertices is called a path. A network g is said to be connected if there is a path between any two agents i and j in the network. We use g(i) to denote the connected subgraph to which player i belongs. A connected graph with no cycles (or loops) is called a tree. 4 Let d ij denote the geodesic distance from i to j. Then the diameter D of a graph is the maximum distance d ij over vertex pairs ij. A network is said to be superconnected if it is still connected after the deletion of any link.
Next we define some of the common types of networks that arise in our paper. An empty network (g e ) is one where g ij = 0 for all pairs ij and a complete network (g c ) is a graph in which every player has a direct link to every other player. A center-initiated star is an acyclic network where only one agent (the central agent) establishes a direct link with all the other (n−1) agents. Similarly, a periphery-initiated star is an acyclic network where each of the other (n − 1) agents initiate a link with the central agent. A mixed star is a combination of these two types of stars. A connected acyclic network with exactly one path is called a chain. Finally, two networks g and g 0 are equivalent if g 0 is obtained as a permutation of the strategies of the agents in g. The equivalence relation partitions G into classes and each class is referred to as an architecture.
Benefits. The benefits of player i are given by the total information she can access from the connected component of the network to which she belongs, i.e., B i (g) =
3 At the risk of abusing notation we will use g to denote both the directed and associated undirected graph and use other labels to distinguish between different directed graphs. 4 [BG] define trees as minimally connected networks.
Costs of Information. The cost incurred by agent i to obtain agent j's information is given by φ i (V j , d ij ). We now list the different properties of the cost function.
1. Property HD: Information of higher value is more expensive, i.e.,
While costs are primarily a technological consideration, there are also instances where more valuable information might lead to greater costs. For instance, shipping an original Picasso would be more expensive than shipping an imitation. However, if we set V i = V for all i ∈ I, property HD has no bite and the cost function reduces to φ i (d ij ). We state results for both cases. 5 The driving force behind our results stems from the relationship between distance and costs and is discussed next.
We allow distance to influence costs in two possible ways. These two properties describe alternative notions of distance that are appropriate in different types of situations.
Property LE:
Information that comes through longer paths in the network is more expensive:
3. Property DC: Information coming through shorter paths in the network is more expensive:
Property LE is more appropriate in the context of physical distance, since it is usually more expensive to obtain information from places that are further away. International phone calls and mail are usually more expensive than their domestic counterparts. Property DC captures situations where distance is correlated with delay. Information that comes through longer paths involves a longer waiting time and hence is cheaper. This property is appropriate for information obtained through electronic networks with ABR traffic. Alternatively, it describes the fact that ordinary mail which is cheaper than express mail, is often routed through longer routes or tickets involving longer travel routes are cheaper. In the paper we first provide results from these two assumptions separately, before finally combining them.
Our formulation of the costs of information differs significantly from the one used in [BG] and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . First, in our model all agents pay for all acquired information obtained regardless of whether it is from a direct or a sequence of indirect links. Second, we do not assume an exogenously given cost per link. Consequently, in our model different network structures affect the cost of each piece of information by altering the geodesic distance between agents. This leads to a network formation game with usage costs. A strategy in our context thus may be interpreted as the act of establishing the infrastructure for information networks and may provide a better interpretation of examples like phone calls. Costs in our model may be viewed as the costs of using the network with each agent incurring the cost of acquiring the information. 6 Duplication Costs. Since links themselves are costless in our model, to eliminate situations where players establish bidirectional links with each other, we impose a penalty for duplication. Double links can generate uninteresting multiple equilibria and hence need to be ruled out. Consider for example an equilibrium two player network with one link. Then g ij = 1, g ji = 1 and g ij = g ji = 1 are all Nash equilibria. However, strategically the third equilibrium is no different from the first two and duplication costs rule out such equilibria. Let ∆ g i = {j : g ij = 1 and g ji = 1} be the set of agents with whom player i has double links in network g. Each double link imposes a small penalty ε > 0 (ε ¿ min{V i }) on both players since strategies are chosen simultaneously. 7 Payoffs. The payoffs to player i from the network g are given by
where i 6 = j with φ(V j , d ij ) either having the DC or the LE property. The 6 Later we introduce exogenously given costs for establishing a link. These are fixed costs and are paid only by the initiating agent, while all agents continue to pay the usage costs.
7 This may be viewed as a penalty for wasting resources by establishing unnecessary infrastructure. Link duplication has interesting consequences primarily in the context of reliability problems (see Bala and Goyal (2000b) and Haller and Sarangi (2004) ).
following functional form for the payoff function is also used to obtain additional insights in the paper.
where i 6 = j. 8 Note that this payoff function satisfies properties HD and DC. A direct link always gives a payoff of zero, while the indirect links yield positive payoffs. This allows us to focus directly on the significance of paying for information obtained through indirect links. Observe also that the cost of information never exceeds its value. This assumption is maintained throughout the paper.
Equilibrium. Given a network g, let g −i denote the network that remains when all of agent i's links have been removed. Let g = g i ⊕ g −i where the symbol ⊕ indicates that g is formed by the union of links in g i and g −i . A strategy g i is said to be a best response of agent i to g −i if:
A strict Nash network is one where agents are playing strict best responses.
Efficiency. The commonly used welfare measure is defined as the sum of the payoffs of all agents. Formally, let W : G → R be defined as:
for all g 0 ∈ G. We now illustrate the implications of our cost function through an example by comparing the equilibrium outcomes to those of [BG] .
Example 1: Let the payoff be given by equation (2) . Assume V i = V for all i ∈ I. Let g 12 = g 14 = g 31 = 1, and g ij = 0 for all other ij ∈ I × I. This is a Nash network in the [BG] formulation where each agent pays a cost 0 < c ≤ V = 1 only for her direct links. However, when φ(V j , d ij ) = V /d ij , player 3 would be able to minimize her cost by removing the current link, and choosing either g 34 = 1 or g 32 = 1. Thus, this network is not Nash for the specified payoff function. In the equilibrium network agent 3 links to one endpoint, which is an equilibrium in [BG] as well. Thus, even when the value of information is the same for all players, distance or delay alters the cost of information acquisition and plays a crucial role in determining the equilibrium.
Equilibrium and Efficiency
This section contains our results for the two benchmark cost formulations. We begin by describing Nash networks. This is followed by the characterization of efficient networks.
Equilibrium Outcomes
Our first result pertains to the basic architecture of an equilibrium network.
Theorem 1: Let the payoff function be given by (1) with V j = 1 for all j ∈ I. Then: (i) Under property LE, the (directed) complete graph is the only Nash equilibrium. ( ii) Under property DC, every Nash network is either empty or a tree. However, not every tree is Nash.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that the above theorem holds when we allow for endowment heterogeneity as well as property HD. We know from Cayley's formula (West (1996) ) that for a vertex set of size n there are n n−2 trees. The last part of Theorem 1 indicates that this formula is an upper bound on the number of equilibria.
We now use equation (2) to investigate the equilibrium properties of certain popular architectures like the chain and star graphs. Besides their popularity, the chain is the largest diameter graph and the star is the smallest diameter graph where agents have positive benefits from indirect links. Note that equation (2) incorporates property HD and the proposition shows that this primarily serves to resolve coordination problems by helping fix the location of agents in the equilibrium network. The result holds without this property as well.
Proposition 1: Let the payoffs be given by equation (2) and assume that player i has value V i with V 1 ≤ V 2 ≤ · · · ≤ V n . Then the following chains are the only strict Nash networks for k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Insert Figure 1 here.
While the above configurations are the only strict Nash networks, the set of chain networks that are Nash includes other configurations as well. Using the assignment of values described above, a chain given by the links g 21 = g 23 = 1 and g kk+1 = 1 for all k ∈ I\{1, 2} is also Nash. Also, when V i = V for all i, i.e., costs are a function of 1/d ij only, any chain is Nash and chains where each player makes only one direct link are strict Nash. We now analyze the popular star configurations. 9 Proposition 2: Let the payoffs be given by equation (2) . Then ( i) The center-initiated star network is always Nash. ( ii) The periphery-initiated star can never be Nash for n ≥ 6. (iii) When V i = 1 for all i, a Nash network will never contain a periphery-initiated star as a subgraph.
It is easy to see that the center-initiated star is Nash even if all agents possess the same value of information. However, it is not strict Nash since the central agent gets a payoff of zero in equilibrium. The intuition for why periphery-initiated stars are not Nash for n ≥ 6 is fairly straight-forward. When the number of players in the game increases, the amount of information at stake also increases, and it is better for players in the network to increase their distance to other players. This creates an incentive to access the center of the star through indirect links, increasing the distance to other players, thereby increasing payoffs. However, for n < 6 it may be possible to arrange the agents in such a way (with the lowest value agent at the centre) that a periphery-initiated star is Nash. Clearly, property HD plays a crucial role in the formation of such stars. Finally the last part of the proposition demonstrates that in the absence of the heterogeneous endowment property periphery-initiated stars never arise. 10 From Proposition 2 we can infer that mixed star networks can only be Nash when conditions for both non-mixed type stars are satisfied. Consequently, the agent with the lowest value must always be the central agent 9 A star network must have at least 3 peripheral nodes connected to a central node. 10 For an example we refer the reader to Sarangi, Ray and Kannan (2004) . and the number of peripheral agents initiating links must not exceed five.
To sum up, an equilibrium network does not contain cycles and peripheryinitiated stars. Chains and center-initiated stars on the other hand form equilibrium networks. However, not all concatenations of center-initiated stars and chains will be in equilibrium. The network shown below is composed of a chain and a center-initiated star but is not in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 2 here.
In Figure 2 , player a would be better off by linking to player b. Due to this new link, the number of agents that are at maximal distance from agent a is the largest and the set of agents at minimal distance is the lowest.
Costly Direct Links
We now assume that each direct link has cost c > 0 making the duplication penalty redundant. This cost facilitates comparison with the rest of the literature and can be viewed as a setup cost. Of course we can assume property LE or DC along with this. Let µ d i (g) be the set of agents with whom player i has a direct link. Then the payoff to player i from the network g is given by
Remark 1: Assumption DC and payoffs with costly direct links. Since the proofs are similar, we only state which of our current results hold under this new payoff specification. We find that Theorem 1(ii) holds. Using a modified version of equation (2), we find that our result about peripheryinitiated star can still be obtained, but a center-initiated star will no longer be Nash. Our result about chain networks is also valid as long as link formation yields positive net benefits.
Remark 2: Assumption LE and payoffs with costly direct links. Longer graph distances affect net benefits negatively via increased operating costs and due to the additional costs incurred to prevent information decay or erosion of quality of routing/service. In a recent paper on game theoretic routing Fabrikant et al. (2003) also have a payoff function where routing through more nodes is costlier. For small direct link costs complete networks will still be equilibria (as long as 0 < c < φ(V, 2) − φ(V, 1)), while for large link costs one would expect minimally connected networks as in [BG] . For very large link costs the empty network is both Nash and efficient. In the intermediate range a number of possibilities can arise and the subsequent section sheds more light on this.
Assumption DC and How it Relates to the Literature
We now provide a key insight about Nash networks and discuss its relationship to the rest of the literature.
Remark 3:
Consider any model where the cost of information never exceeds its (positive) value and links are fully reliable. The (undirected) Nash network will always be a tree if (1) the information flow is two-way, and (2) the cost of information is more if it comes via a shorter path. Since the cost of information never exceeds its value, a player's total payoff never decreases as she gets access to more players. This ensures that every Nash graph is connected. The two-way flow and (full) link reliability assumptions ensure that no links need to be duplicated. Next suppose that the network g is connected and the cost of information is less if it comes through a longer path, but that g contains a cycle. Clearly, the network g could not have been Nash, since at least one player in the cycle would gain from deleting a link to another player in the cycle. Hence every Nash network satisfying the above two conditions will be a tree.
It can be argued that these conditions are also applicable to other specifications of the payoff function in the literature, including the one in [BG] . In their model, each agent pays a cost c > 0 for each of her direct links, but does not pay anything for knowing others through her direct links. One way to interpret this is that in [BG] direct links are costly while indirect links are free, i.e., information that comes through a shorter path is more expensive! Assumption DC may be construed as a general form of this relationship where indirect links impose positive costs in a specific manner. In [BG] the non-initiating agent also gets free information, but network formation is driven by the behavior of agents who form the links. Since they operate under an assumption like DC we see the emergence of minimally connected networks in equilibrium in the [BG] model. Galeotti, Goyal and Kamphorst (2004) extend the basic [BG] framework by introducing endowment heterogeneity as well as different link formation costs. By assuming heterogeneity in endowments (but not in costs), they find minimally connected networks. This is because agents in their model have incentives similar to agents in our model. Heterogeneity in costs leads to a more general result where equilibrium networks are minimal networks in the sense that deletion of links increases the number of components. The intuition for this result is also similar, except that in this case heterogeneity in costs can lead to multiple minimal components in equilibrium.
Next consider Bala and Goyal (2000b) where links can fail with a uniform probability p ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium they find super-connected networks when the size of the player set increases and the costs of information are not very high. Here too information obtained through indirect links is free but as the size of the networks increases, the expected value of information coming through shorter paths now decreases (because of the probabilities involved) instead of being constant as in [BG] . Alternatively, the implicit cost of information increases with distance, i.e., without additional links expected indirect benefits decrease when the size of society increases. This gives rise to super-connected networks. Recall, in Theorem 1 when longer paths raise the cost of information, we get the limiting case of super-connectedness − the complete network. However in Haller and Sarangi (2004) where different links can have different failure probabilities, and hence varying costs, such super-connected networks may not arise in equilibrium. 11 
Efficient Networks
We now examine network structures that maximize the sum of the payoffs of all agents and compare them with the Nash networks.
Theorem 2: Let the payoff function be given by (1) with V j = 1 for all j ∈ I. Then, ( i) Under property LE, the (directed) complete graph is the only efficient network. ( ii) Under property DC, the chain is the only efficient network.
Proof : See Appendix.
11 Note that while decay and link failure probability both lead to cycles, the incentives in both cases are different. For more on this topic see Haller and Sarangi (2004) .
First note that the above statements are also true when we introduce endowment heterogeneity and allow for property HD. Next, Theorem 2( ii) tells us that efficient networks are also chains. So when all agents have identical values of information, the set of Nash networks is the same as the efficient networks. The similarity between the strict Nash and efficient architectures stems from the fact that every agent pays for all the information they acquire. The crucial difference with the previous literature is the absence of the externality accruing from (free) indirect links. Therefore depending on the cost function we find that efficient networks, like Nash networks, are either complete or minimally connected. Finally,when agents have different values of information, the two sets of networks do not always coincide because the value of information affects the location of agents.
Model Variations
In this section we explore some further modeling ramifications.
Information Decay
Decay creates an incentive for the agents to form shorter paths. To study information decay in the DC cost model we now introduce a variation of equation (2) . For the sake of simplicity let
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the decay parameter. Observe that a direct link now yields a payoff of −δV i , and as before, this functional form enables us to focus on the indirect links. It is easy to verify that for δ ∈ (1/4, 1] the empty network is the unique Nash network. For δ ∈ (0, 1/4], every Nash network is connected.
In contrast to our earlier finding under the DC model, we show that under equation (4) a periphery-initiated star will indeed be Nash over a range of the decay parameter.
Proposition 3: Let the payoffs be given by (4) and 1/6 < δ ≤ 1/4. Then, ( i) Periphery-initiated stars are the unique Nash networks. ( ii) If the value of endowment differs across agents, it is lowest for the central agent.
Based on the above two propositions we can make some further observations that characterize the types of possible Nash networks. First, since direct links yield negative payoffs, under the decay model a center-sponsored star and mixed star will never arise in equilibrium. Second, observe that player i's payoff from a link with player j equals zero when she is at a distance d = ( 1 + √ 1 − 4δ)/2δ from j. Consequently as δ → 0, player i prefers longer paths. Therefore as in the previous section we expect that minimally connected networks will form Nash networks. The same holds for efficiency. Finally it can be shown that it is possible to have cyclic networks as well as acyclic networks in equilibrium. 12 To sum up, we find that for very high δ the empty network is stable and for very low δ the outcome is similar to the DC model. Players prefer longer paths, and both efficient and Nash networks will tend to be minimally connected. We also find that when δ ≤ 1/6, cyclical networks can be stable, but for δ > 1/6, the Nash network again is the (minimally connected) periphery-sponsored star. Thus Nash networks are trees for both high and low δ but can have cycles in the intermediate range. The low δ trees however have large diameters and the high δ trees have low diameters.
Finally note that decay is of no consequence under the LE cost model. It simply reinforces every agent's incentive to establish a direct link to all the other agents leading to the complete network.
Combining Assumptions LE and DC
We now introduce a model with costly link formation that combines both assumptions LE and DC. The payoff of player i in the network g is given by
where c ≥ 0 is the cost of forming a link.
Assumption U: Assume that costs of link formation decline up to a distance d * and then increase. In other words
Thus we have a U-shaped cost function with declining costs up to d * . 13 For simplicity we also assume that V i = 1 for all i ∈ I. We can now rewrite assumption U as
(1 − φ (1, d ij ) ). It represents benefits net of the usage costs while assumption DC holds. Consequently, up to d * usage costs decrease with distance and offset link formation costs. Hence the sum of net benefits V * which depends on d * forms the threshold for comparing with the link formation cost because beyond d * , the usuage costs and link formation costs both decrease benefits. It is now possible to state the following result.
Theorem 3: Let the payoffs be given by (5) . Then under assumption U, when c > V * the empty network is the unique Nash network. When c ≤ V * then every Nash network is connected.
with distance and every player has an incentive to form a minimal number of links. However when c > V * , g ij = 0 for all ij ∈ I × I. Moreover for d ij > d * no player wants to form a link since (1 − φ(1, d * + 1)) < V * < c. Hence the empty network is the unique Nash network. The second part follows from the fact that it is desirable to link to all agents and since the inequality is reversed every agent is willing to form at least one link.
When c ≤ V * , a fairly large class of networks are still permissible as equilibria. To understand more about equilibrium networks in this range we will consider two different cases.
Case (i): Let c → 0. In this case we get a model that is very similar to the decay model analyzed above. When d * is very high, i.e., as d * → ∞, then regardless of the fact that links are free, the equilibrium architecture is a chain network. Similarly, when d * → 1, we will get the complete networks as the equilibrium Nash architecture. In the intermediate range just as in the decay model, equilibrium architectures will depend on the precise value of d * and both periphery-initiated stars as well cycles could arise in equilibrium.
Case (ii): Intermediate cost range. Formally this implies that c ≤ V * , but unlike sase (i) costs are not close to zero, i.e., c >> 0. Again when d * → ∞, despite the costly nature of link formation, the distance effect dominates and chains are the only Nash networks. Suppose d * → 1. We know that if links are costless, then g c is the Nash network. However with costly link formation only a finite number of links will be profitable for each player. Hence as d * → 1, we will find k−regular networks in equilibrium. In the intermediate range for d * , cyclic networks can be supported as equilibria. These networks can be wheels, or wheels with spokes, or even starred wheels depending on which effect dominates. Yet for some parameter values it is also possible to have periphery-initiated stars in equilibrium. It is difficult to make more detailed remarks for this range without using a more precise formulation for the payoff function.
Conclusion
The paper identifies the nature of stable and efficient information networks when agents have to pay for information acquired through indirect links as well. Further the properties of stable networks are investigated by introducing costs of link formation. The range of possible equilibrium networks and the conditions under which they can occur are stated. The paper sheds light on the role of assumptions like two-way information flow, free indirect benefits and full reliability in models of Nash networks.
One interesting extension would be to introduce reliability issues in the model. Another, perhaps more interesting problem, would be to impose the restriction that each agent could only form a limited number of links. Such a link formation capacity constraint would lead to interesting insights on network formation because informationally advantaged agents will now form links only with other such agents. While it will lead to minimal network architectures, more importantly, it can lead to social stratification based on the information endowment of agents.
of generality set g ij = 1. Since V j = 1, we have φ(V j , d ij ) = φ(d ij ). Under property LE, φ(1) < φ(d ij ). Hence g cannot be an equilibrium network. Further, since this is true for all d ij > 1, player i can minimize her costs by establishing direct links with all the players. As a similar reasoning holds for all i ∈ I, g c will be the equilibrium network. Finally the link duplication penalty ensures that this complete graph is a directed network.
(ii) First, consider a disconnected network with k components, i.e., C j , j = 1, 2, . . . , k. If |C j | < 2 for all j, a player is indifferent between forming and not forming links. Consequently, g e will be Nash but not strict Nash. This also holds when V = 1 ≤ φ(1). To prove that it must be a tree, we first show that the Nash network must be connected. Let g be a disconnected Nash network with components C 1 and C 2 where (at least) one component is at least of size 2. Without loss of generality, let |C 2 | ≥ 2 and agent j ∈ C 1 . If j links to a player in C 2 then there is some j 0 ∈ C 2 who is at least two links away from j. By connecting to C 2 , player j will get a positive payoff. Hence g cannot be Nash. Next, we show that a connected Nash network will contain no cycles. Suppose not. Then there exists a Nash network with at least one cycle. Consider the cycle j 1 j 2 j 3 · · · j r j 1 . Then either g jrj 1 = 1, or g j 1 jr = 1. If g jrj 1 = 1, then j r wants to delete the link since φ(1)
Similarly if g j 1 jr = 1, j 1 will delete the link. Hence a Nash network cannot contain the cycle described above. Finally (direct link) cycles between two agents are ruled out by the duplication penalty. Hence, the Nash network will be a tree.
For the second part a counter-example suffices. Let g 12 = g 23 = g 24 = 1, with no other links existing in the graph. Using equation (2), player 1 can get the information of all the other three and has to pay a cost of (1 + 0.5 + 0.5) = 2. If player 1 deletes the current link to 2 and instead links to player 3, then her total benefits will not change but her cost reduces to 1 + 0.5 + 1/3 = 11/6 < 2. Clearly, the original tree is not in equilibrium.
2. Proof of Proposition 1 : Since the chain is a tree by Theorem 1 it is a candidate for Nash. Also note that a player who establishes a new link to a second player earns a payoff of zero from this direct link making her indifferent to forming it. The only tree where every player has the smallest number of direct links is the chain. Hence a strict Nash network must be a chain. Now we show that in this graph each player is playing their unique best response. First consider player k. If player k deletes the link with player 1 and links to player j, then her costs will be [
Hence player k will not gain by changing her strategy. Similarly, any other player m ∈ I\{1, k}, will incur a larger cost by deviating from the current strategy. Thus, this particular group of chains is in equilibrium.
3. Proof of Proposition 2: (i) A center-initiated star is a tree where the central agent has a payoff of zero. Also, she cannot increase her payoffs by deleting any of her current links. All other agents can only add links since they do not have any links to remove. But this will lead to cycles that only reduce their current payoff. Thus, no agent can improve her payoff by deviating from the current strategy and the center-initiated star is Nash.
(ii) Let agent j's endowment be V j with V 1 ≤ V 2 ≤ · · · ≤ V n . First we will argue that in equilibrium the central agent must have the lowest value. Suppose not. Then there exists agent j 6 = 1 who is the central agent. Since this is a star, agent 1 has a link to agent j. Then k ∈ I\{j,1} will receive a higher payoff by linking to player 1. Hence player 1 has to be the central agent. Let the initial periphery-initiated star with agent 1 in the center be denoted by g ps . Let agent k, 2 < k ≤ n, alter her strategy by deleting the link to 1 and establishing a link to player 2, as direct links should always be to the agent with least value. For g ps to be Nash, we need C k (g ps )−C k (g 0 ) ≤ 0. This difference can be written as {3V 1 + (Λ − V 1 − V k ) − 4V 2 }/6 ≤ 0. Now, (Λ − V 1 − V k ) ≥ (n − 2)V 2 since V 2 is the smallest value in the set I\{1, k}. Hence {3V 1 − 4V 2 + (n − 2)V 2 }/6 ≤ 0, or (n − 2)V 2 ≤ 4V 2 − 3V 1 . This is inconsistent if (n − 2) ≥ 4 i.e., for n ≥ 6. Hence, the result.
(iii) The proof is simple and we refer the reader to Sarangi, Ray and Kannan (2004) for this.
4.
Proof of Theorem 2: (i) Under property LE, there is no conflict between efficiency and stability. The network that minimizes the costs of all agents also minimizes the overall cost since both efficiency and stability require all agents to be as close to each other as possible. (ii) Under property DC, only a connected network can be efficient. Moreover since cycles will raise the cost of acquiring information only trees can be efficient graphs. Next we argue that only the chain is efficient. Consider a tree with diameter k (0 < k < n−1). If k = n−1, then we have a chain. Let d ij = k 6 = 1. Then there exists a star network somewhere in the graph in the path between i and j since at least one vertex has two edges emanating from it. Without loss of generality, let such a star be at a distance m (0 < m < k) from j. Since the star has at least two arms one of these links can be rearranged to increase the diameter. The diameter now becomes k + 1 and irrespective of the agent who forms this new link, the total cost is lowered for the entire tree. This eliminates all other trees except chains as efficient graphs.
5. Proof of Proposition 3 : We will only prove part (ii) since (i) is easily obtained from this. Let player 1, the lowest value agent be the center of the star. She cannot improve her payoffs by altering her strategy. Player i ∈ I\{1} can either add more links, or sever the link to the center and make one or more links to other nodes. Using (5) it is easy to verify that increasing the number of direct links reduces total payoffs. Next consider making exactly one link to a non-central node (say player 2) while deleting the link to player 1. Let g ps be the original star graph and g 0 = g ps − g k1 + g k2 , (1 < k < n) the modified graph. For g ps to be the Nash we need Π k (g ps ) − Π k (g 0 ) ≥ 0. We can write the difference between these two payoffs as (V 1 − V 2 )(δ − 1/2) + P n j=3,j6 =k V j (δ − 1/6). Note that the diameter of the underlying undirected graph is 2. Using this it is easy to verify that for δ > 1/4, the graph itself is not connected. This provides the upper bound on δ. Next (V 1 − V 2 )(2δ − 1)/2 ≥ 0 for δ ≤ 1/4 and the whole expression is positive when δ > 1/6. Thus, a periphery-sponsored star graph will be Nash if 1/6 < δ ≤ 1/4. This is also true when V i = V since Π k (g ps ) − Π k (g 0 ) = (n − 2)(6δ − 1)V/6. To show uniqueness, recall that the star architecture is the only possible network with D < 3. A center-initiated star or mixed star is never Nash since the central agent has negative payoffs. Hence the periphery-initiated star is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
